Signaling legitimacy across institutional contexts-The intermediary role of corporate social responsibility rating agencies by Kölbel, Julian F & Busch, Timo
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2019
Signaling legitimacy across institutional contexts-The intermediary role of
corporate social responsibility rating agencies
Kölbel, Julian F ; Busch, Timo
Abstract: Research Summary Good corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings can increase a firm’s
legitimacy and reduce its default risk. Yet, the interpretation of CSR varies between different countries.
We investigate whether CSR ratings have a risk‐mitigating effect across different institutional contexts.
We find that good CSR ratings have a general risk‐mitigating effect. Yet, we also find that the effect
decreases when the rating agency is embedded in the institutional context of its home country and the
rated firm operates in a country with a different culture or regulatory system. This suggests that a
rating agency’s country of origin and its embeddedness in that country’s context play an important
role in the relationship between CSR ratings and default risk. Managerial Summary In this article,
we investigate to what extent CSR rating agencies signal organizational legitimacy across institutional
contexts. Specifically, we evaluate how institutional distance between the rating agency and the rated
firm moderates the negative effect of the CSR rating on the firm’s default risk. We compare two CSR
rating agencies, OEKOM, which is strongly embedded in its institutional context, and ASSET4, which
operates across diverse institutional contexts. Based on a panel of 604 firms in 13 countries from 2011 to
2016, we show that CSR ratings from both rating agencies have a risk‐mitigating main effect. Yet, only
in the case of OEKOM is the effect negatively moderated by regulatory and cultural distance. Thus, the
legitimating effect of institutionally embedded CSR rating agencies decreases with institutional distance.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.1355
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-175713
Journal Article
Published Version
 
 
The following work is licensed under a Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
License.
Originally published at:
Kölbel, Julian F; Busch, Timo (2019). Signaling legitimacy across institutional contexts-The intermediary
role of corporate social responsibility rating agencies. Global Strategy Journal:Epub ahead of print.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.1355
R E S E A RCH ART I C L E
Signaling legitimacy across institutional contexts—
The intermediary role of corporate social
responsibility rating agencies
Julian F. Kölbel1 | Timo Busch2
1Department of Banking and Finance,
Center for Sustainable Finance and Private
Wealth, University of Zurich, Zurich,
Switzerland
2Faculty of Business, Economics and Social
Science, University of Hamburg, Hamburg,
Germany
Correspondence
Julian F. Kölbel, Department of Banking
and Finance, Center for Sustainable Finance
and Private Wealth, University of Zurich,
Plattenstrasse 32, 8032, Zurich,
Switzerland.
Email: Julian.koelbel@bf.uzh.ch
Abstract
Research Summary: Good corporate social responsibility
(CSR) ratings can increase a firm's legitimacy and reduce
its default risk. Yet, the interpretation of CSR varies
between different countries. We investigate whether CSR
ratings have a risk-mitigating effect across different insti-
tutional contexts. We find that good CSR ratings have a
general risk-mitigating effect. Yet, we also find that the
effect decreases when the rating agency is embedded in
the institutional context of its home country and the rated
firm operates in a country with a different culture or regu-
latory system. This suggests that a rating agency's country
of origin and its embeddedness in that country's context
play an important role in the relationship between CSR
ratings and default risk.
Managerial Summary: In this article, we investigate to
what extent CSR rating agencies signal organizational
legitimacy across institutional contexts. Specifically, we
evaluate how institutional distance between the rating
agency and the rated firm moderates the negative effect of
the CSR rating on the firm's default risk. We compare two
CSR rating agencies, OEKOM, which is strongly embed-
ded in its institutional context, and ASSET4, which
operates across diverse institutional contexts. Based on a
panel of 604 firms in 13 countries from 2011 to 2016, we
show that CSR ratings from both rating agencies have a
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risk-mitigating main effect. Yet, only in the case of
OEKOM is the effect negatively moderated by regulatory
and cultural distance. Thus, the legitimating effect of insti-
tutionally embedded CSR rating agencies decreases with
institutional distance.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become an important legitimating factor
in the business sphere. In a poll of the top 1,000 CEOs from around the world, 93% stated that CSR was
important for their organization's future success (UN Global Compact—Accenture, 2013). One impor-
tant reason that firms engage in CSR is to gain and maintain legitimacy (Brammer, Jackson, & Matten,
2012; Campbell, 2007; Chiu & Sharfman, 2011). Legitimacy, according to institutional theory, is an
important condition for firm survival (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Scott, 2008; Zuckerman, 1999). The
relationship between CSR, legitimacy, and firm survival is supported by a host of empirical studies that
demonstrate that CSR has an insurance effect (Chava, 2014; Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014;
Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Koh, Qian, & Wang, 2013; Shiu & Yang, 2017).
However, one of the key findings in the international business literature is that CSR practices
and their legitimating effect are heterogenous across different institutional contexts (Aguilera, Rupp,
Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Campbell, Eden, & Miller, 2012; Crilly, Ni, & Jiang, 2016; Husted &
Allen, 2006; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Matten & Moon, 2008). For instance,
Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) show that the level of CSR adoption is strongly dependent on a firm's
home country institutions. Crilly et al. (2016) show that the same CSR practices may be perceived quite
differently in different institutional contexts. Thus, in cross-national settings, there are different kinds of
CSR practices that lead to legitimacy in different institutional contexts (Miska, Witt, & Stahl, 2016).
The context-specific nature of CSR has implications for an emerging debate about the role of
CSR rating agencies (Chatterji, Durand, Levine, & Touboul, 2016; Doh, Howton, Howton, & Siegel,
2010; Slager, Gond, & Moon, 2012). CSR rating agencies function as institutional intermediaries,
which translate institutional norms and expectations vis-à-vis CSR into a performance standard,
assess firms against this standard, and, ultimately, signal the quality of a firm's CSR practices to
investors and customers (Doh et al., 2010). In this role, CSR rating agencies serve as “legitimating
agencies,” which signal a firm's legitimacy to key constituents (Casile & Davis-Blake, 2002;
Durand & McGuire, 2005; Rao, 1994). Yet, given that norms and expectations vis-à-vis CSR vary
with context, there is a varying correlation between CSR ratings and a firm's sociopolitical
legitimacy—a correlation that we refer to as “signal fit.”
In this article, we investigate how CSR rating agencies signal legitimacy across various institu-
tional contexts by carefully studying the relationship between CSR ratings and default risk. We argue
that CSR practices that are widely accepted across different institutional contexts tend to increase sig-
nal fit and drive a negative relationship between CSR ratings and default risk. However, we also
argue that CSR ratings reflect context-specific interpretations of CSR, especially when the rating
agency is deeply embedded in its original institutional context. On this basis, we predict that the
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negative effect of CSR ratings on default risk is most pronounced when the rated firm originates in
the same country as the rating agency, and, conversely, that the negative effect decreases as the insti-
tutional distance between the rating agency and the rated firm increases.
Our empirical analysis relies on a panel data set of 604 firms from 13 countries between 2011 and
2016. We use data from two different CSR rating agencies. The first agency is OEKOM, which orig-
inates in, and has been firmly embedded in, the German institutional context. The second is ASSET4,
which originates in Switzerland, but has a more international character and is not embedded in any
particular institutional context. The results show that high CSR ratings from either of the two agen-
cies reduce default risk for the international sample of rated firms. However, in the case of OEKOM,
this effect is moderated by differences in the institutional context between Germany—the rating
agency's home country—and the home country of the rated firm. Specifically, the risk-reducing
effect is decreased by regulatory and cultural distance from Germany. For the ASSET4 data, we do
not find a similar moderating effect.
This study makes two interrelated contributions to the international business literature. First, we
demonstrate that the CSR insurance effect is partially, but not entirely, moderated by context-specific
conceptualizations of CSR. On the one hand, the relationship between CSR ratings and default risk
seems to be driven by widely accepted CSR practices, which is in line with prior studies on the insur-
ance effect (Godfrey et al., 2009; Koh et al., 2013; Shiu & Yang, 2017) and with the view that CSR
is increasingly being standardized (Christmann, 2004; Fortanier, Kolk, & Pinkse, 2011). On the other
hand, the relationship is moderated by regulatory and cultural distance between the rating agency
and the rated firm, when the rating agency is embedded in a particular institutional context. This
lends support to the view that CSR is shaped by local norms and pressures (Campbell et al., 2012;
Crilly et al., 2016; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). This study reconciles these two literatures by
suggesting that the insurance effect of CSR ratings is greatest within one homogeneous institutional
context. But since there are widely accepted CSR practices that are consistently reflected in different
CSR ratings, the insurance effect of a particular CSR rating also persists in cross-national settings.
Second, we highlight the role of CSR rating agencies as institutional intermediaries (Doh et al.,
2010; Slager et al., 2012). Prior work emphasizes the importance of institutional intermediaries in
representing and standardizing institutional norms (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Durand &
McGuire, 2005; Rao, 1994). While institutional pressures normally favor a convergence of perfor-
mance criteria, Chatterji et al. (2016) highlight the problematic fact that CSR ratings greatly and per-
sistently diverge in their definitions of CSR. We address this problem by examining institutional
intermediaries facing cross-national heterogeneity of norms. Our results suggest that CSR rating
agencies cannot develop one CSR performance standard that reflects all institutional contexts equally
well. Instead, it seems that agencies must choose between representing one specific context,
attempting to average across different contexts, or using multiple context-specific standards. The fact
that these various choices exist helps to explain why the assessment results of CSR rating agencies
currently continue to diverge.
2 | CSR, LEGITIMACY, AND DEFAULT RISK
Corporate social responsibility has become an important and diverse field of management research
(Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Garriga & Melé, 2004). A growing stream within this field takes an institu-
tional theory perspective on CSR (Brammer et al., 2012; Campbell, 2007; Matten & Moon, 2008). In
this article, we adopt this institutional theory perspective to investigate the relationship between
CSR, legitimacy, and default risk, with a particular emphasis on the role of CSR rating agencies. By
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framing CSR rating agencies as institutional intermediaries, we synthesize a body of literature that
studies how the interpretation of CSR varies in cross-national settings and a body of literature that
empirically demonstrates the risk-mitigating effects of CSR performance standards.
From an institutional theory perspective, CSR is a construct that means different things in differ-
ent places since it is shaped by regulatory, normative, and cognitive pressures (Brammer et al., 2012;
Campbell, 2007). As institutional pressures vary across institutional contexts, CSR practices differ
from context to context (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Jamali & Mirshak, 2007; Miska et al., 2016).
This leads to a diversity in the practice of CSR that is particularly salient in cross-national settings.
For example, CSR practices differ between the United States and Europe (Doh & Guay, 2006;
Matten & Moon, 2008). Also, multinational corporations adapt their CSR practices when venturing
to other countries (Campbell et al., 2012; Rathert, 2016), and stakeholders in different countries
respond in heterogeneous ways to the same CSR practices (Crilly et al., 2016).
We follow Ioannou and Serafeim in adopting a broad definition of CSR as “a business organiza-
tion's configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and pol-
icies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal relationships” (Wood,
1991, p. 693). This definition is ideal for investigating CSR in a cross-national setting because to the
phrase “societal relationships” implies that CSR may comprise different sets of practices for different
societies. In that regard, the definition reflects the context-specific nature of CSR, which is central to
a comparative institutional analysis of CSR practices.
Gaining and maintaining legitimacy is a key reason firms practice CSR (Chiu & Sharfman, 2011;
Godfrey, 2005; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Legitimacy is a “generalized perception or assumption that
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). By legitimacy, we specifically
mean sociopolitical legitimacy, a type of legitimacy that refers to the compliance with legal rules and
moral norms that govern a firm's relationship with society (Bitektine, 2011). This includes both the
social and the ecological domains, for example, compliance with labor and environmental regula-
tions, and adhering to what is perceived as socially and environmentally acceptable by customers,
employees, and other stakeholders.
Legitimacy, in turn, increases a firm's probability of survival (Oliver, 1991; Ruef & Scott, 1998;
Suchman, 1995). Organizations that satisfy culturally approved criteria and enjoy the support of sur-
rounding institutions have a higher likelihood of surviving, sometimes irrespective of their perfor-
mance and stability in other dimensions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008). Conversely,
organizations that lack legitimacy are fundamentally at risk. Organizations that lack legitimacy—
those that violate widely accepted norms and understandings and are discredited by respected
authorities—have a decreased chance of survival (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Zuckerman, 1999).
Thus, the institutional theory perspective on CSR suggests that CSR enhances a firm's chances of
survival by increasing its legitimacy.
There is a body of empirical literature that supports these theoretical arguments by demonstrating
that CSR has risk-mitigating effects. Often referring to the “insurance hypothesis” (Godfrey, 2005), a
string of studies has provided evidence that CSR reduces a variety of financial risks (Chava, 2014;
Cheng et al., 2014; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & Mishra, 2011; Godfrey et al., 2009; Goss &
Roberts, 2011; Koh et al., 2013; Shiu & Yang, 2017). These studies provide strong and consistent
evidence that firms that practice CSR are perceived as less risky investments by investors.
The empirical studies most directly related to the concept of firm survival are those that investi-
gate the effect of CSR on default risk (Drago, Carnevale, & Gallo, 2019; Chava, 2014; Goss &
Roberts, 2011). Default risk is defined as the risk that a firm “will fail to meet its obligations in
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accordance with agreed terms” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000). It reflects inves-
tors' assessments of the probability that a firm will survive and remain solvent until funds it has
borrowed are due to be paid back. Given that fixed income investors commonly lend to firms with a
time horizon of several years, default risk inherently reflects a firm's probability of surviving in the
long term. High default risk indicates that investors have doubts about whether a firm will survive, or
whether it might instead file for bankruptcy before its debt investment matures. Bankruptcy is a form
of organizational death (Sheppard, 1994), that is, the opposite of firm survival. Low default risk indi-
cates that investors are fairly certain that a firm will survive until its debt investment matures. Default
risk, thus, reflects a firm's likelihood of survival, as it is perceived by its creditors.
However, there is a yet unsolved tension in the literature regarding the intermediary role of CSR
rating agencies. On the one hand, the empirical studies testing the insurance hypothesis are consistent
with an institutional theory perspective on CSR. The fact that CSR is associated with lower default
risk is consistent with the view that CSR enhances a firm's legitimacy and, consequently, its probabil-
ity of survival. On the other hand, empirical studies on CSR rely on CSR ratings to test the authors'
hypotheses, implicitly assuming that there is one standard of CSR against which all firms can be
evaluated. This contrasts with the institutional theory perspective on CSR, which emphasizes that
CSR is a fluid construct that is shaped by institutional pressures. Several empirical studies that study
international samples have already highlighted that the effects of CSR ratings on financial perfor-
mance are contingent on institutional context (Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kim, 2017; Hoepner,
Oikonomou, Scholtens, & Schröder, 2016). However, the reliance on a particular CSR rating in
cross-national settings implicitly assumes that CSR can be measured against a single standard,
despite the strong evidence that CSR is a context-dependent construct (Gond & Crane, 2010).
To ease this tension, we generate hypotheses that include CSR rating agencies in the relationship,
and compare two different CSR rating agencies. We argue that CSR rating agencies do not simply
measure the construct of CSR, but also shape its meaning in response to the rating agencies' institu-
tional contexts. In the following hypotheses development, we refine the theoretical link between
CSR, legitimacy, and default risk, by including CSR rating agencies as institutional intermediaries.
3 | HYPOTHESES
3.1 | CSR ratings and default risk
Corporate social responsibility rating agencies are institutional intermediaries (Doh et al., 2010; Rao,
1994), which formalize norms and expectations vis-à-vis CSR into a performance standard, and pro-
vide assessments in the form of CSR ratings. The main audience for CSR ratings are investors, who
commonly pay for the rating agencies' services (SustainAbility, 2017). However, CSR rating agen-
cies also cater to the rated firms and to the wider public (Scalet & Kelly, 2010).
As institutional intermediaries, CSR rating agencies perform three related functions. First, CSR
rating agencies reduce information asymmetry between firms and investors by revealing the latent
quality of a firm's CSR practices. In the absence of rating agencies, it would be difficult for outsiders
to assess whether and how well a firm is practicing CSR because firms hold superior information
about their CSR and may choose whether to disclose it (Lyon & Maxwell, 2008). CSR rating agen-
cies develop screening methodologies to evaluate and communicate firms' CSR practices.
Second, CSR rating agencies create CSR performance standards, which are implicit in the rating
methodology. The basis of any assessment of CSR is a definitive interpretation of what CSR means
(Chatterji et al., 2016). This interpretation is formalized in the rating methodology, which determines
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which specific CSR practices are included in the assessment, how they are evaluated, and how they
are weighted and aggregated into a rating score. Given that CSR is a broad construct, rating agencies
have considerable latitude on how to interpret it (Delmas & Blass, 2010; Delmas, Etzion, & Nairn-
Birch, 2013). For example, there are large differences in the weights that CSR rating agencies assign
to social and environmental aspects of CSR (Capelle-Blancard & Petit, 2017). Chatterji et al. (2016)
show that CSR ratings from different providers do not always converge because each rating agency
defines CSR in its own particular way. Consequently, a CSR rating score reflects both a measure of
CSR, as well as the rating agency's interpretation of what CSR means.
Third, a CSR rating agency signals the legitimacy of rated firms, thereby playing the role of a
“legitimating agency” (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Durand & McGuire, 2005; Durand, Rao, &
Monin, 2007). By creating a CSR performance standard that reflects societal norms and expectations,
CSR rating agencies spell out which concrete CSR practices are deemed legitimate. Accordingly,
firms that perform well against this CSR performance standard are legitimate because they conform
to societal norms and expectations. The same principle of third-party legitimation has been observed
in other domains: Michelin stars signal to what extent chefs and restaurants conform to the norms of
French haute cuisine (Durand et al., 2007), and the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of
Business (AACSB) signals to what extent business schools meet the expectations of students,
employers, and faculty (Durand & McGuire, 2005). In each case, a high score suggests that the rated
organization is behaving in ways that are legitimate in the eyes of its key constituencies and stake-
holders. In the case of CSR ratings, a high score signals that a firm's CSR practices are considered
legitimate by its employees, customers, and investors, as well as by regulators, NGOs, and society at
large.
3.2 | Signal fit
The fact that CSR ratings signal legitimacy forms the basis of the relationship between CSR ratings
and default risk. CSR ratings signal legitimacy to investors, and investors prefer legitimate organiza-
tions because they are more likely to be able to survive until borrowed funds are due to be paid back.
Legitimate firms are more resilient for two main reasons. First, legitimate firms have preferred access
to resources (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). For instance, firms with high CSR ratings find it
easier to attract talent (Bhattacharya, Sen, & Korschun, 2008). Also, other organizations are more
willing to provide resources to legitimate firms, as this allows them to be associated with high legiti-
macy actors (Ruef & Scott, 1998). Second, legitimate firms are more likely to be trusted (Zucker,
1987), which is an important asset in times of crisis. For example, firms that are involved in accidents
are penalized less when they are considered legitimate (Godfrey et al., 2009). Firms that had accumu-
lated trust through CSR also emerged from the financial crisis of 2008 with less damage than firms
that had not accumulated trust (Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2017). For these reasons, high CSR ratings
are associated with low default risk.
However, there is likely to be variation in the extent to which CSR ratings signal legitimacy. This
is because CSR rating agencies develop standards of CSR performance, even though different CSR
practices are associated with legitimacy in different institutional contexts (Crilly et al., 2016). To
explore this variation, we define the extent to which CSR ratings are correlated with a firm's underly-
ing legitimacy as “signal fit” (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2010). Signal fit describes the cor-
relation between a firm's CSR rating and a firm's effective legitimacy in the institutional context in
which the firm is operating. Signal fit is high when a rating agency's CSR performance standard rep-
resents the rated firm's stakeholder norms and expectations vis-à-vis CSR. In this case, a strong CSR
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rating score signals legitimacy. Signal fit is low when a rating agency's CSR performance standard
does not represent the rated firm's stakeholder norms and expectations vis-à-vis CSR. In this case,
neither a high nor a low CSR rating score signals organizational legitimacy. The concept of signal fit
allows us to formulate hypotheses about the relationship between specific CSR ratings (rather than a
general concept of CSR) and default risk. In the following hypotheses, we explore the conditions that
are likely to increase or decrease this signal fit.
3.3 | Widely accepted CSR practices
Signal fit is increased by the presence of widely accepted CSR practices. Assuming that CSR has
completely opposite meanings in two different countries, a CSR rating score that has a high signal fit
for one of the countries would have a signal fit of zero for the other one. However, to the extent that
there are certain CSR practices that are consistent with each of the two country's specific interpreta-
tions of CSR, then the CSR rating score that has a good signal fit for one of the countries will also
have a minimal level of signal fit for the other country.
Corporate social responsibility practices have increasingly converged at the international level
(Christmann, 2004; Fortanier et al., 2011; Slager et al., 2012). Fortanier et al. (2011) show that the
efforts of supranational institutions, such as the United Nations, the International Labour Organiza-
tion, and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), increasingly harmonize the CSR
activities of firms from different countries. Even more directly, organizations such as the sustainabil-
ity accounting standards board seek to standardize and formalize CSR reporting globally, focusing
on the aspects that are consistently relevant to stakeholders (Khan, Serafeim, & Yoon, 2016). These
standardization efforts are likely to drive diverse and context-specific CSR practices toward more
uniform and widely accepted practices.
Provided that there are widely accepted CSR practices, CSR ratings are likely to reflect them.
First, CSR rating agencies themselves are active participants in the dialogue about the standardization
of CSR reporting (Slager et al., 2012). Second, CSR rating agencies source a considerable amount of
their data from firms' own CSR reporting (SustainAbility, 2017), meaning that CSR practices that are
consistently reported are likely to be part of the CSR rating score. Therefore, in the presence of
widely accepted CSR practices, we expect that CSR ratings have high signal fit and signal a firm's
legitimacy. Based on the outlined relationship between legitimacy and default risk, this suggests a
general negative effect of CSR ratings on default risk.
H1: CSR ratings have a negative effect on default risk.
3.4 | Context-dependent interpretations of CSR
In contrast to the increasing global standardization of CSR practices, signal fit is reduced by context-
dependent interpretations of CSR. Many firms practice CSR in a context-specific way that depends
on the country where they originate and where they establish new operations (Aguilera & Jackson,
2010; Campbell et al., 2012; Miska et al., 2016; Rathert, 2016). The explanation for this diversity is
that different firms are shaped by different institutional pressures.
This line of reasoning can be applied to CSR rating agencies. Rating agencies, just like any other
organization, are shaped by the institutional context in which they originate and in which they are
embedded. The institutional context is especially influential for institutional intermediaries because
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their role is to formalize the institutional pressures that surround them. Thus, the institutional context
that a rating agency is embedded in is likely to leave an imprint on the way in which CSR is inter-
preted and formalized in its rating methodology (Durand & McGuire, 2005).
To the extent that a CSR rating agency is embedded in a particular institutional context, the signal
fit of its ratings is high—within that institutional context. However, the signal fit deteriorates if the
rated firm operates in a country other than where the rating agency is based.
3.5 | Regulatory distance as a moderator
The regulatory environment has an important influence on the way in which CSR is practiced
(Campbell et al., 2012; Reimann, Rauer, & Kaufmann, 2015). A country's regulations are a promi-
nent feature of the institutional context and a common differentiator in management studies
(Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). Faced with similar or identical environmental and social issues, differ-
ent countries take different regulatory approaches to address these issues. Accordingly, we define
regulatory distance as the degree to which regulations in the environmental and social domains are
different between two institutional contexts.
As Campbell et al. (2012) observe, CSR commonly comprises practices that go beyond legal
requirements and fill existing institutional voids. Therefore, different laws and regulations immedi-
ately change the set of activities that are recognized as CSR activities. Consider, for example, the
provision of healthcare for employees by firms. In countries with mandatory health insurance, offer-
ing basic healthcare to employees will be seen as less valuable as compared to countries where
workers do not have health insurance by default (Matten & Moon, 2008). Many other types of regu-
lation, such as pollution control or subsidies for environmentally friendly technologies, can turn what
is considered a specific CSR practice in one country into a practice that is merely an act of compli-
ance in another country.
The regulatory environment of a rating agency's home country is thus likely to be reflected in the
agency's rating methodology. On this basis, we propose that regulatory distance between the home
country of a CSR rating agency and the home country of a rated firm decreases the signal fit of CSR
ratings. The greater the regulatory distance, the greater the mismatch between the regulatory environ-
ment that is embedded in the CSR rating and the regulatory environment in which the firm is operat-
ing will be. For instance, a firm might receive a high rating score for using energy saving equipment.
When the use of this equipment is mandated by local law, it is questionable whether the firm's legiti-
macy has increased. Consequently, as regulatory distance increases, CSR ratings increasingly fail to
signal a firm's legitimacy. We therefore propose that when a rating agency is firmly embedded in a
national regulatory context, regulatory distance to the rated firm weakens the relationship between
the CSR rating score and default risk.
H2: The effect of CSR ratings on default risk will be negatively moderated by regulatory distance
between the rating agency's home country and the rated firm's home country, such that the negative
effect of CSR ratings on default risk is weaker when regulatory distance is larger.
3.6 | Cultural distance as a moderator
National culture also influences the interpretation of CSR in different countries (Scholtens & Dam,
2007). National culture refers to common experiences and shared meanings that are common within
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a country and are valid despite the fact that they are not formally stated or enforced (Tsui, Nifadkar, &
Ou, 2007). National culture is a primary component of a country's institutional context and has an
important influence on the way in which societies and organizations function. It also has an impor-
tant influence on the way in which abstract concepts, such as “fairness,” are interpreted in different
ways in different countries (Tsui et al., 2007).
Wang and Juslin (2009) show that the Chinese interpretation of CSR is distinctly shaped by Tao-
ist ideas about harmony, which are central to Chinese culture. Consequently, Chinese firms empha-
size contributions to social stability and employment. However, ensuring equality between different
ethnic groups, which is important in Western societies' interpretations of CSR, is less emphasized in
China. In a more general vein, Campbell et al. (2012) show that with increasing cultural distance, the
variations in firms' CSR activities and related stakeholder interpretations also increase. This provides
evidence that different national cultures generally result in different interpretations of CSR.
Corporate social responsibility rating agencies that are embedded within a specific national cul-
ture are likely to reflect this cultural background in their rating methodologies. For example, a CSR
rating agency that originates in a Christian country might reflect Christian ideas about honoring god's
creation and thus specifically address protecting the environment in its rating methodology (Teck
Hui, 2008). Consequently, CSR ratings that reflect one single cultural context might be incongruent
with other cultural backgrounds. On this basis, we propose that cultural distance between the home
country of a CSR rating agency and the home country of a rated firm decreases the signal fit of CSR
ratings. The greater the cultural distance, the greater the mismatch between the cultural background
that is embedded in the CSR rating and the cultural background in which the firm operates will
be. We therefore predict that when a rating agency is firmly embedded in a national cultural context,
cultural distance to the rated firm weakens the relationship between the CSR rating score and
default risk.
H3: The effect of CSR ratings on default risk will be negatively moderated by cultural distance
between the rating agency's home country and the rated firm's home country, such that the negative
effect of CSR ratings on default risk is weaker when cultural distance is larger.
4 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our sample consists of listed firms from 13 different countries. For the independent variable, we used
two alternative CSR ratings—one from OEKOM research AG (henceforth OEKOM), and one from
ASSET4. Data on default risk and financial control variables were obtained via Thomson Reuters
Eikon. Data on cultural distances were obtained from the GLOBE project (globeproject.com/studies),
and data on regulatory distances were obtained from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). Our final sample consists of 604 firms at the intersection of these data
sets. Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the sample across countries and time periods.
4.1 | OEKOM ratings
OEKOM utilizes a total of 95 indicators on 22 themes equally distributed over the social and envi-
ronmental domains. The indicators are aggregated into a single continuous rating score, which can
take any value between one (lowest grade) and four (highest grade) in decimal increments. OEKOM
assesses all companies, regardless of geographic origin, against the same CSR definition. The rating
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methodology is adapted to fit specific industries, but it is not adapted for a company's geographic ori-
gin. Thus, OEKOM assesses all companies from the same industry against the same universal defini-
tion of CSR. OEKOM ratings are revised on a quarterly basis. A complete description of the
indicators and the rating methodology is available in detail online (ARISTA, 2012).
As an organization, OEKOM is deeply embedded in the institutional context of Germany.
Founded in 1993 in Munich, OEKOM pioneered CSR ratings in Germany and was among the
earliest services of this kind worldwide. OEKOM's offices have been in Munich since its founda-
tion, and almost all of OEKOM's roughly 70 employees are located in Munich. The vast majority
of OEKOM's employees speak German, and most were born in and have been educated in
Germany. Furthermore, the founders are German and the advisory board is comprised of native
Germans. OEKOM was an independent company until 2018, 2 years after the end of our study
period, when it was acquired by Institutional Shareholder Services, a financial service provider
based in London.
OEKOM's rating methodology is based on prior academic work, the Frankfurt-Hohenheimer
guidelines for the ethical assessment of firms, developed by three German professors (Hoffmann,
Ott, & Scherhorn, 1997). These guidelines were written with an explicit ethical objective, namely
to make business more compatible with cultural development, social equity, and environmental
sustainability. Although they encompass a global perspective, some elements of the Frankfurt-
Hohenheimer guidelines hint at their German origin. For instance, the criteria in the social domain
include the importance of labor unions and employee participation—aspects that are firmly institu-
tionalized in Germany, and more so than in other countries such as the United States. Notwith-
standing the scientific quality of the guidelines, the fact that they were written exclusively by
Germans suggests that the interpretation of CSR contained within them is shaped by the institu-
tional context of Germany. Combined with the embeddedness of OEKOM as an organization in
TABLE 1 Country overview
Country
No. of
firms
Cultural distance
to Germany
Regulatory distance
to Germany
Cultural distance
to Switzerland
Regulatory distance
to Switzerland
Germany 29 0.00 0.00 2.88 29.84
Switzerland 10 2.88 29.84 0.00 0.00
United States 259 6.44 30.23 11.77 25.72
Australia 18 6.53 19.74 9.47 17.10
United Kingdom 37 8.37 36.50 12.80 35.11
Italy 7 9.16 34.31 15.24 16.23
Canada 22 10.17 44.87 14.93 30.04
France 44 13.73 25.04 12.81 18.97
Netherlands 10 14.35 37.81 16.95 20.45
Finland 6 18.94 42.26 20.80 34.40
Sweden 9 18.94 35.80 21.52 27.05
Spain 6 20.29 25.00 22.53 15.91
Japan 145 21.65 32.48 18.66 21.10
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Germany, these are strong reasons to believe that CSR ratings from OEKOM reflect a uniquely
German perspective on CSR.
4.2 | ASSET4 ratings
ASSET4 in many ways provides the same service as OEKOM. However, there are important differ-
ences regarding assessment methodology, organizational history, and institutional embeddedness of
the organization. ASSET4 utilizes 250 individual indicators across 15 subcategories of CSR, which
are aggregated into three main pillars: environmental, social, and corporate governance. Thus, a first
difference is that ASSET4 explicitly includes corporate governance in its CSR ratings. A fairly
detailed description of the company's rating methodology is available upon request at Thompson
Reuters.
Similar to the OEKOM method, ASSET4 aggregates the indicators into a single rating score,
which ranges from 0 to 100. Also like OEKOM, the scores are calculated in an industry specific
TABLE 2 Quarter overview
Quarter # Of firms Mean OEKOM Mean ASSET4 Mean CDS spread
March 31, 2011 304 2.14 0.84 4.39
June 30, 2011 314 2.14 0.84 4.44
September 30, 2011 315 2.13 0.84 4.85
December 31, 2011 319 2.14 0.84 4.78
March 31, 2012 322 2.14 0.83 4.54
June 30, 2012 327 2.14 0.83 4.74
September 30, 2012 343 2.15 0.84 4.63
December 31, 2012 348 2.14 0.83 4.52
March 31, 2013 355 2.13 0.83 4.46
June 30, 2013 395 2.07 0.80 4.46
September 30, 2013 441 2.01 0.79 4.41
December 31, 2013 515 1.94 0.77 4.23
March 31, 2014 576 1.91 0.77 4.26
June 30, 2014 574 1.91 0.77 4.13
September 30, 2014 572 1.91 0.77 4.19
December 31, 2014 575 1.91 0.77 4.17
March 31, 2015 568 1.91 0.81 4.11
June 30, 2015 562 1.92 0.82 4.18
September 30, 2015 563 1.92 0.82 4.32
December 31, 2015 554 1.93 0.82 4.32
March 31, 2016 547 1.94 0.84 4.38
June 30, 2016 537 1.95 0.85 4.36
September 30, 2016 532 1.95 0.85 4.30
December 31, 2016 512 1.95 0.86 4.27
Abbreviation: CDS, credit default swap.
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way. ASSET4 ratings are updated continuously. However, in a striking departure from how OEKOM
calculates its scores, ASSET4 scores are calculated differently for different regions, in order to reflect
the different importance assigned to certain aspects of CSR in different regions.
As an organization, ASSET4 is similar in size to OEKOM with approximately 100 employees,
but the employees come from diverse international backgrounds and are not associated with any par-
ticular geographical context. ASSET4 was founded as a private company in 2003 in Switzerland.
However, as an organization it was never deeply embedded in the Swiss context, and it has had an
international perspective from the start. In 2006, the company received a private equity investment
from Goldman Sachs (2006), and as early as 2007 the company had offices in London, New York,
Mauritius, and India. In 2009, ASSET4 was acquired by Thomson Reuters (Reuters, 2009), an inter-
nationally active financial information broker based in Canada, and became a part of its extensive
data service offerings for investors.
The rating methodology of ASSET4 is primarily driven by the needs of investors. It emphasizes
the objectivity and comparability of the ratings, as well as the possibility that investors can create
their own ratings based on ASSET4 data. In the documentation of its ratings, ASSET4 acknowledges
that there is no perfect way to construct CSR ratings. ASSET4 has a ratings committee that meets on
a quarterly basis to decide on potential changes to the methodology, but information about who is on
that ratings committee is not publicly disclosed. The information that is available does not reveal any
details about how ASSET4 interprets the notion of CSR in its methodology. In contrast to OEKOM,
the methodology does not seem to be based on ethical considerations. Taken together, ASSET4 as an
organization is not firmly embedded in any particular organizational context, but tends to operate in
a very cross-national setting. Consequently ASSET4 ratings represent a cross-national perspective
on CSR.
4.3 | Default risk
We measure default risk in terms of the spreads on firm-specific credit default swaps (CDSs). A
CDS is a derivative that is linked to a borrower's outstanding debt and represents, in principle, an
insurance against default. CDSs are internationally standardized financial assets that are completely
independent of a firm's location and tax status (Fabozzi & Mann, 2012). CDS spreads, thus, represent
an internationally comparable measure of default risk. These spreads are popular in financial studies
because they offer an accurate and timely measure of default risk (O'Kane & Sen, 2005). CDSs are
traded on a large and liquid financial marketplace, which ensures efficient pricing. We chose the
5-year CDS because it is the most common and most liquid derivative on the market. For each firm,
we observe the last quoted CDS spread within a quarter as our measure of default risk. The spread is
expressed in basis points (1/10,000), comparable to the level of interest paid on a loan. Given that
the distribution of CDS spreads is skewed, we take the natural logarithm, which yields a dependent
variable with a normal distribution.
4.4 | Institutional context
We compute the variables regulatory distance and cultural distance to measure differences between
the institutional contexts of a firm's country of incorporation and the home country of the rating
agency. To compute this variable, we apply the squared Mahalanobis distance measure across several
dimensions of institutional distance. In the following equation, I denotes vectors for country i and
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reference country j, containing country-specific observations of institutional context across
n dimensions. S is the covariance matrix of the data set with i countries and n dimensions.
D= Ii− Ij
 TS−1 Ii− Ij:
 
Mahalanobis distance is recommended as an improvement upon earlier measures of cross-national
distance, such as the one introduced by Kogut and Singh (1988). This is because by including the
covariance matrix, Mahalanobis distance takes into account that different dimensions of institutional
distance are usually correlated and have heterogeneous scales and variances (Berry, Guillén, & Zhou,
2010; Kandogan, 2012). This avoids, for example, overweighting differences in dimensions with
high variance, as well as overweighting differences in separate dimensions which are highly corre-
lated. Since OEKOM is based in Germany and ASSET4 is based in Switzerland, we compute institu-
tional difference twice: first against the reference country of Germany, and a second time against
Switzerland.
Regulatory distance is based on 14 dimensions: five dimensions stem from the environmental pol-
icy domain, and nine dimensions stem from the social policy domain. The environmental policy
dimensions are taken from the environmental policy stringency index, provided by OECD. The
dimensions of the index are (a) environmentally related taxes, (b) emission trading schemes, (c) feed-
in tariffs for renewable energy, (d) emission limit values, and (e) government expenditure on research
and development in environmentally friendly technologies. The social policy dimensions are taken
from the social expenditure index, also provided by the OECD. The dimensions are expenditures in
the categories (a) active labor market programs, (b) family, (c) health, (d) housing, (e) incapacity
related, (f) old age, (g) survivors, (h) unemployment, and (i) other social expenditures. Regulatory
distance describes how different a country's regulatory context is relative to Germany or Switzerland,
respectively, based on these 14 regulatory dimensions. To allow for calculation of the covariance
matrix, data from all OECD countries is used.
Cultural distance has been widely applied in management studies. Cultural distance calculations
are based on the nine cultural value dimensions established by House (2004), namely
(a) assertiveness, (b) institutional collectivism, (c) in-group collectivism, (d) future orientation,
(e) gender egalitarianism, (f) humane orientation, (g) performance orientation, (h) power distance,
and (i) uncertainty avoidance. Cultural distance measures how different a country's cultural context is
across these dimensions, relative to Germany or Switzerland, respectively.
4.5 | Control variables
Our model specification follows the empirical approach of Chava (2014). First, we control for firm
size because large firms generally experience lower default risk. Firm size is measured as the natural
logarithm of total assets in billions of U.S. dollars (USD) and labeled Firm size. Second, we control
for return on assets (ROA), since the ability to generate income from existing assets is a risk-
mitigating factor. ROA is measured in USD billions and labeled ROA. Third, we control for leverage,
since higher leverage makes it increasingly uncertain whether the firm can fulfill all of its debt obli-
gations. Leverage is defined as the ratio of outstanding liabilities over total assets and labeled
Leverage.
Our analysis differs from Chava (2014) as it is based on a global sample of firms. Therefore,
adhering to the recommendations of Tsui et al. (2007), we also control for country-specific factors
that exist in addition to institutional aspects and are likely to have an effect on the dependent variable
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default risk. First, we control for the baseline default risk within a country, operationalized as the
average of the dependent variable per country-year, and labeled country risk. Second, we control for
the sovereign credit risk of the country as an indicator of the overall risk perception of a country's
economy. It is operationalized as the logarithm of the 5-year CDS spread for the respective country's
sovereign debt, and labeled sovereign risk. Finally, we control for economic development as an indi-
cator of the current business climate, using the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP), labeled
GDP growth. All independent variables were measured at least 1 month before the dependent vari-
able, in order to allow time for the information to be incorporated.
4.6 | Empirical analysis
Our empirical approach includes fixed effects at the industry and quarter levels, to control for indus-
try specific conditions and cross-sectional shocks. We confirm that this fixed effects model is appro-
priate by means of a Hausman test (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Based on tests for heteroscedasticity
of residuals, we estimate robust standard errors clustered by firm.
5 | RESULTS
Our sample is an unbalanced panel of quarterly observations from 614 firms between 2011 and
2016, resulting in 11,201 firm-quarter observations. Table 3 shows the distributions of all continuous
variables. Table 4 shows the correlation matrix for all continuous variables in the regression. Note-
worthy is the correlation between OEKOM and ASSET4 ratings of 0.52, which indicates that the
CSR ratings differ substantially between these two rating agencies. The initial sample is determined
by the intersection of firms rated by OEKOM and the availability of dependent and control variables.
The sample for ASSET4 is a subsample that covers 97% of the original sample with a total of 10,970
observations.
TABLE 3 Distributions
Min Max Mean Median SD
CDS spread 2.94 6.57 4.36 4.29 0.75
Firm size 21.24 26.17 23.92 23.91 1.04
Leverage 0.12 1.03 0.65 0.65 0.16
ROA −0.29 0.23 0.05 0.04 0.05
Country risk 3.69 5.54 4.37 4.35 0.34
Sovereign risk 1.90 5.31 3.24 3.17 0.60
GDP growth −2.70 4.71 1.68 1.81 0.97
OEKOM 1.03 3.11 1.99 1.98 0.43
ASSET4 0.05 0.96 0.81 0.89 0.18
Regulatory distance (to Germany) 0.00 44.87 29.44 30.23 8.61
Cultural distance (to Germany) 0.00 21.65 11.06 6.53 6.79
Regulatory distance (to Switzerland) 0.00 35.11 24.19 25.72 5.71
Cultural distance (to Switzerland) 0.00 22.53 13.34 11.77 4.52
Abbreviation: CDS, credit default swap; GDP, gross domestic product; ROA, return on assets.
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Model 1, shown in Table 5, demonstrates a baseline model with only the control variables. Most
of the control variables are highly significant and point in the expected direction: leverage increases
default risk, while firm size and ROA reduce default risk. The adjusted R-squared is at 53% of vari-
ance explained, indicating that the control vector captures a substantial part of the variance. Model
TABLE 5 Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Firm size −0.21*** −0.19*** −0.18*** −0.19*** −0.19*** −0.18*** −0.18***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Leverage 1.09*** 1.08*** 1.05*** 1.07*** 1.06*** 1.06*** 1.02***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
ROA −4.90*** −4.86*** −4.45*** −4.83*** −5.06*** −4.44*** −4.77***
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39)
Country risk 0.94*** 1.01*** 1.08*** 1.00*** 0.76*** 1.07*** 0.86***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Sovereign risk −0.06 −0.07 −0.01 −0.06 0.06 −0.00 0.11***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP growth 0.00 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.03* 0.00 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
OEKOM −0.15** −0.48*** −0.30***
(0.06) (0.15) (0.09)
ASSET4 −0.49*** −0.67 −0.82***
(0.12) (0.37) (0.22)
Regulatory distance −0.03* −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Cultural distance −0.05*** −0.03**
(0.01) (0.01)
OEKOM: regulatory
distance
0.01*
(0.01)
OEKOM: cultural
distance
0.02*
(0.01)
ASSET4: regulatory
distance
0.01
(0.01)
ASSET4: regulatory
distance
0.02
(0.01)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 .54 .54 .54 .54 .55 .54 .56
Num. obs. 11,201 11,201 10,970 11,201 11,201 10,970 10,970
Abbreviation: GDP, gross domestic product; ROA, return on assets.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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2 includes the OEKOM rating as an additional explanatory variable. The coefficient for OEKOM is
negative (−0.15) and highly significant (p > .01), indicating that firms with a high OEKOM score
have lower default risk. Model 3 shows the same relationship for ASSET4 scores, where the coeffi-
cient is also negative (−0.49) and highly significant (p < .001). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported: A
higher CSR rating score is associated with lower default risk.
Model 4 tests the moderating influence of regulatory distance with reference to Germany. It
includes the main effect of regulatory distance and the interaction effect between regulatory distance
and OEKOM. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive (0.01) and significant (p < .05). This
supports Hypothesis 2 for the German context: the greater the regulatory distance between the
respective home countries of a firm and a CSR rating agency, the weaker the risk-reducing effect of
a good CSR rating.
Model 5 tests the moderating influence of cultural distance with reference to Germany. It presents
the main effect of cultural distance, along with the interaction term between OEKOM and cultural
distance, which is positive (0.02) and significant (p < .05). This result indicates that increasing cul-
tural distance diminishes the effect of OEKOM scores on default risk and supports Hypothesis 3: the
greater the cultural distance between the respective home countries of a firm and a CSR rating
agency, the weaker the risk-reducing effect of a good CSR rating.
Models 6 and 7 show the interaction of ASSET4 scores with regulatory and cultural distance with
reference to Switzerland. The interaction terms are not significant in either model. While this out-
come does not empirically prove that institutional distance has no effect for a rating agency that
operates cross-nationally, it is in line with our expectations, given that ASSET4 is a rating agency
that is not embedded in its original Swiss context.
To illustrate the moderation effect for the German context, Figure 1 shows the moderating effect
of cultural distance on the relationship between the OEKOM rating and default risk. The graph is
FIGURE 1 Moderation
effect of cultural distance on
the relationship between
OEKOM and default risk
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generated by predicting the dependent variable based on the cultural interaction model for several
levels of cultural distance. The independent variables, besides OEKOM rating and cultural distance,
are kept constant at the sample mean. Figure 1 clearly shows how the negative relationship between
the OEKOM rating and default risk fades with increasing cultural distance. For a cultural distance of
zero, that is, for German firms, the relationship between the OEKOM rating and default risk is nega-
tive. For firms in Canada, which has a cultural distance of 10.17, the relationship is still negative, but
the slope is only half as steep. For firms with a cultural distance above a value of 20, such as firms in
Japan, the relationship is even slightly positive.
5.1 | Robustness checks and further analyses
We performed two robustness checks. First, the number of firms rated by OEKOM increased from
2014 onwards because before 2014 OEKOM only rated firms that cleared a certain CSR performance
threshold in a prescreening. Starting in 2014, OEKOM rated all companies, regardless of their CSR
performance. The prescreening creates a potential concern that the sample is skewed toward firms
with high CSR ratings. However, rerunning the analysis with only the data from 2014 to 2016 pro-
duces virtually the same results, even with slightly higher significance levels. Second, even though
we controlled for fixed effects on the firm and quarter levels, there is still potential for unobserved
firm characteristics to bias the results. However, rerunning the analysis with firm-level fixed effects
produces very similar results for the interaction terms, making us confident that our findings are not
subject to unobserved heterogeneity.
In addition to these robustness checks, we investigated whether there were important differences
between different rating components of OEKOM, that is, its social and environmental aspects. The mod-
eration through regulatory and cultural distance is more pronounced for the social aspect. This suggests
that environmental CSR practices vary less across contexts as compared with social CSR practices.
6 | DISCUSSION
This article investigates how CSR rating agencies—functioning as legitimating agencies—shape the
relationship between CSR, legitimacy, and default risk. Including CSR rating agencies themselves in
the theoretical reasoning generates new insights regarding the boundary conditions of the CSR insur-
ance effect and the role of CSR rating agencies as institutional intermediaries. Furthermore, it pro-
vides important implications for investors, managers, and researchers.
The first contribution of this article is to demonstrate that the insurance effect of CSR is partially,
but not entirely, moderated by context-specific conceptualizations of CSR. The empirical literature
so far suggests that performing against CSR ratings has a risk-mitigating effect (Godfrey et al., 2009;
Koh et al., 2013; Shiu & Yang, 2017). In contrast, the international business literature holds that
legitimacy and its associated benefits arise from conforming to context-specific CSR practices
(Campbell et al., 2012; Crilly et al., 2016; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). In a cross-national setting,
this raises the question of whether firms can reduce default risk by conforming to local norms or to
global CSR performance standards, or both.
This study provides a differentiated answer to this question. On the one hand, it shows that CSR
ratings are generally associated with lower default risk. Despite fundamentally different rating
approaches, CSR ratings from both OEKOM and ASSET4 are associated with lower default risk.
This suggests that the insurance effect of CSR ratings is not entirely dependent on the way in which
CSR is interpreted and measured. Instead, there seems to be a set of widely accepted CSR practices
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that decrease default risk in any institutional context. On the other hand, the study shows that
OEKOM CSR ratings reduce default risk more for German firms, and less for firms that originate in
countries with a different institutional context. The effect decreases with increasing regulatory and
cultural distance from Germany. This suggests that the insurance effect is moderated by differences
in the institutional context because different norms and expectations result in different interpretations
of CSR. Thus, conforming to CSR performance standards reduces default risk to the extent that these
standards reflect widely accepted CSR practices, or CSR practices that are accepted in the firm's local
context.
We interpret these results with the concept of signal fit: CSR ratings reduce default risk to the
extent that the CSR rating signals a firm's underlying legitimacy. We show that there are variations
in signal fit, depending on which CSR rating agency is chosen, to what extent it is embedded in a
particular institutional context, and in which institutional context the company operates. When stud-
ies investigate CSR ratings in a domestic setting, where both rating agency and rated firm are within
the same institutional context, signal fit is likely to be high. Most of the studies on the insurance
effect of CSR use samples of U.S. firms and rely on ratings from U.S.-based rating agency Kinder,
Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD). However, in cross-national studies, such as the present article, the
concept of signal fit highlights that the same CSR rating might signal different levels of legitimacy
across different institutional contexts.
Inserting the concept of signal fit into the relationship between CSR ratings and default risk has
the potential to inform further theorizing on boundary conditions that emerge in cross-national set-
tings. The concept of signal fit contributes a way to integrate empirical findings that are based on
CSR ratings—and thus implicitly assume that there is a CSR performance standard—with a perspec-
tive that views CSR as inherently context specific.
The second contribution of this article is to highlight that CSR rating agencies do not simply pro-
vide objective measures of CSR. In addition to providing a measure, rating agencies provide an inter-
pretation of CSR that is implicit in their ratings. Our results suggest that a rating agency's country of
origin and its embeddedness in that country influence its interpretation of CSR along with the mean-
ing of the ratings that it provides.
We show this by comparing two different CSR rating agencies: OEKOM, which is strongly
embedded in the institutional context of Germany, and ASSET4, which has a very international pres-
ence and no strong roots in any particular country. Our analysis shows that the effect of CSR ratings
on default risk differs substantially in a cross-national setting. While both CSR ratings have an effect
on default risk, we find a sensitivity to regulatory and cultural distance only for OEKOM ratings.
This finding extends prior research on CSR ratings as institutional intermediaries (Chatterji et al.,
2016; Doh et al., 2010; Slager et al., 2012). One of the important features of institutional intermedi-
aries is that they standardize constructs, thereby allowing measurement and orientation, ultimately
facilitating transparency and competition (Durand & McGuire, 2005; Rao, 1994; Ruef & Scott,
1998). However, these processes have typically been studied within a homogenous institutional con-
text, where uniform institutional pressures favor convergence toward one common interpretation.
In our setting, CSR rating agencies are faced with the challenge of attempting to standardize a
construct that is interpreted differently in different contexts. The first option for dealing with this
challenge is the one that OEKOM pursues, which appears to rate firms against an interpretation of
CSR that is congruent with the German context. This means that OEKOM ratings are not ideal for
gauging the legitimacy of firms in Spain or Japan, for instance. However, it does mean that OEKOM
ratings reflect firm performance against one consistent CSR performance standard. The second
option is that used by ASSET4, which appears to rate firms relative to an interpretation of CSR that
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represents the firm's own context. This kind of rating, which reflects the norms and expectations that
the rated firm is actually exposed in its institutional context, can signal a firm's legitimacy more reli-
ably than an OEKOM rating. However, an ASSET4 rating relies on a method that shifts the standards
of CSR performance between different countries.
Chatterji et al. (2016) demonstrate that CSR ratings by different rating agencies continue to
diverge because these agencies have different views of what CSR means. We offer an explanation of
why different rating agencies have different views and how this, in turn, affects the relevance of CSR
ratings for determining legitimacy and risk. First, this study suggests that a rating agency's
embeddedness in its original institutional context has an important influence on how it
operationalizes CSR in its methodology. Thus, different CSR rating agencies may provide different
scores to the same company, because they come from different institutional contexts and have differ-
ent perspectives on the same company. Second, this study suggests that in a cross-national setting,
rating agencies face a trade-off between measuring CSR against one universal standard or against
multiple context-dependent standards. Taken together, the origin of CSR rating agencies and the
corresponding differences in rating methodologies effectively explain the discrepancies between
CSR ratings.
6.1 | Limitations
There are several limitations that should be kept in mind when interpreting the results of this study.
We find support for our moderating hypotheses based on data from only one CSR rating agency,
OEKOM, which is strongly embedded in its original institutional context. We compare this to
ASSET4, a CSR rating agency that operates independently of its original institutional context, and
do not find the same effects. While these results are consistent with our hypothesis that a CSR rating
agency's institutional embeddedness has implications for the legitimating effect of its ratings, they
leave open the possibility that endogenous factors specific to our research case are driving the results.
Unfortunately, even if we included all existing CSR rating agencies in our analysis, the sample
would be too small to fully eradicate this concern. Nevertheless, the study provides theoretical rea-
sons why institutional distance interferes with the legitimating effect of CSR ratings and presents evi-
dence that this may indeed be the case.
Moreover, while measures of institutional distance are widely accepted in the literature, there are
challenges to their validity (Shenkar, 2001). Most of the theoretical and methodological shortcom-
ings apply to situations where interactions between specific actors are investigated, for example,
headquarter–subsidiary relations. In our research setting, we do not focus on such interactions. Thus,
the illusion of symmetry, causality, and discordance (Shenkar, 2001) can be ignored. However, we
must acknowledge that large corporations often have a strong international presence, which means
that there is some ambiguity regarding the national context against which institutional distance
should be measured. Nevertheless, the context that tends to be most important for firm survival, and
thus for our measure of default risk, is likely to remain the context of the country of incorporation,
which we use in this study. Finally, our measure of cultural distance is linear and reflects a single
point in time. Thus, we are not able to explore the possibility that institutional distances may change
over time, as well as the possibility that there may be cultural thresholds or tipping points that change
the dynamics of this relationship.
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6.2 | Implications
The findings have profound implications for empirical research in the CSR domain. Given that there
are differences between different CSR ratings, which are related to the rating agencies' interpretations
of CSR, the choice of one CSR rating agency is likely to influence results. Researchers should be
aware that choosing a CSR rating agency means buying into its specific interpretation of CSR.
Rather than avoiding the discussion around the meaning of CSR (Gond & Crane, 2010), researchers
should assess whether the rating agency's approach suits their research objectives. The problem arises
in particular in cross-national settings. ASSET4 ratings, which have become popular for usage in
recent research (Cheng et al., 2014; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012), seem useful for international sam-
ples because they adapt the meaning of CSR to the regional context. However, the fact that ASSET4
has different standards in different regions also raises questions about how exactly these standards
differ. The bottom line is that researchers should be aware that CSR rating agencies provide not only
a measure but also an interpretation of CSR.
A promising avenue for future research lies in reapplying the concept of signal fit to other rela-
tionships in cross-national settings. For example, certifications by the ISO may provide different sig-
nals in different contexts—even though the certification process is highly standardized. A second
avenue for future research lies in investigating the history of CSR rating agencies. While our study
hints at the institutional pressures that shape CSR rating agencies as organizations and their rating
methodologies, a case study approach could provide a more detailed understanding of the mecha-
nisms that shape and differentiate CSR rating agencies and their ratings.
The results also have important implications for investors and managers. Investors, who are
interested in CSR from an instrumental perspective and hold globally diversified portfolios,
might be better served with a rating agency such as ASSET4. Regardless of context, it reflects
whether a firm is in line with its stakeholder's expectations. But investors with an ethical mis-
sion, such as churches, may prefer a rating such as OEKOM, which applies a single standard uni-
versally. From an ethical point of view, it may not be acceptable that certain aspects of CSR, for
example, gender equality, are considered only to the extent that they are important in the firm's
local context.
For managers the results have two implications. First, there seems to be a set of CSR prac-
tices that is consistently part of different CSR rating methodologies. These widely accepted
CSR practices seem very promising in terms of increasing a firm's legitimacy and lowering its
default risk. In addition, there seem to be CSR practices that are more context specific. Man-
agers could further increase organizational legitimacy by adding these CSR practices in the con-
texts where they are appropriate. In order to learn which CSR practices are appropriate,
managers may be able to learn most from locally embedded rating agencies. For instance,
regarding CSR practices in Germany, OEKOM is likely to have superior information. A general
CSR strategy focused on widely accepted practices, combined with local CSR strategies that are
informed by local legitimating agencies, is likely to lead to an approach to CSR that is optimal
in terms of reducing default risk.
7 | CONCLUSION
There is a fundamental tension between the view that CSR rating agencies formalize and standardize
CSR (Chatterji et al., 2016; Doh et al., 2010; Slager et al., 2012), and the view that CSR is inter-
preted differently in different contexts (Campbell, 2007; Crilly et al., 2016; Ioannou & Serafeim,
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2012). This study synthesizes these views by framing CSR rating agencies as institutional intermedi-
aries that create and formalize interpretations of CSR, which may be more or less embedded in a par-
ticular institutional context. Our results suggest that, on the one hand, there are widely accepted CSR
practices that are always part of different interpretations of CSR by various rating agencies. These
practices reduce default risk consistently across different institutional contexts. On the other hand,
our results suggest that when a CSR rating agency is strongly embedded in its original institutional
context, its CSR ratings have a stronger negative effect on default risk for firms in the rating agency's
home country than for firms from countries that have very different regulatory approaches or cultural
backgrounds. These results suggest that even though CSR rating agencies standardize CSR in their
rating methodologies, these standards can be context specific and thus may reinforce the variety of
CSR practices in cross-national settings.
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